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Ali Moheyaldeen

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Investigative Report: The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR)

Background and Timeline

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) is a UK-based human rights monitoring organisation founded in May 2006 by Rami Abdulrahman (real name Ossama Suleiman) (The man tracking Syria’s war deaths — from Britain | The Times of Israel). Operating from Abdulrahman’s home in Coventry, England, SOHR initially focused on documenting human rights conditions in Syria. When peaceful protests against President Bashar al-Assad erupted in March 2011 and escalated into conflict, SOHR quickly became a key source of on-the-ground information. With most foreign media barred from Syria, international outlets turned to SOHR’s updates; by late 2011 it was being cited “by virtually every major news outlet” as a primary news source on the uprising (Coventry – an unlikely home to prominent Syria activist | Reuters). Abdulrahman, working with a small network of contacts inside Syria, began logging casualties and abuses around the clock from his Coventry base, often surviving on only a few hours’ sleep (Coventry – an unlikely home to prominent Syria activist | Reuters).

Over the past 14 years of war, SOHR has systematically monitored and reported human rights abuses by all sides in the Syrian conflict. It documented government crackdowns, rebel infighting, extremist atrocities, sieges, and foreign interventions. SOHR’s running casualty tallies have provided a grim measure of the war’s toll: by early 2015, it estimated 210,000 people had been killed in Syria’s conflict (Syrian refugees: 3.5 million people flee to neighbouring countries | Global development | The Guardian). As the war ground on, SOHR continued to update these figures; by the 13th anniversary of the uprising in 2024, it reported nearly 618,000 total deaths since 2011 ([PDF] The Impact of the Conflict in Syria pdf (23.2 MB)). These statistics include civilians, combatants on all sides, and victims of torture or detention – reflecting SOHR’s broad scope of documentation. Notably, the United Nations cited at least 100,000 deaths before halting its own count in 2013 (due to verification difficulties) and has since relied on outside monitors for casualty data (Activists: Syria conflict death toll hits 150,344 | AP News). In the absence of official figures, SOHR’s decade-plus record of tracking killings has been an invaluable reference for media and international agencies seeking to understand the conflict’s human cost.

Beyond raw numbers, SOHR has chronicled major human rights violations throughout the war. It has reported on chemical weapon attacks (such as the 2013 Ghouta massacre), the siege and bombardment of civilian areas (from Aleppo to Eastern Ghouta), the rise and fall of the so-called Islamic State (documenting ISIS’s executions and slavery), and the displacement of millions of Syrians. From 2011 through the defeat of ISIS and into the later stages of Syria’s civil war, SOHR issued daily reports detailing airstrikes, prison torture, rebel offensives, and civilian casualties. This running timeline of abuses, updated in near real-time, provided observers worldwide with a continuous chronicle of the Syrian tragedy. Even as the conflict’s dynamics shifted – from peaceful protests to multi-front civil war, to international military intervention and insurgent takeover – SOHR adapted its reporting to cover new developments. By mid-2023, with conflict still simmering, the war monitor had documented over half a million deaths and countless human rights violations, underscoring the persistent commitment of SOHR over 14 years of Syria’s turmoil ([PDF] The Impact of the Conflict in Syria pdf (23.2 MB)) (Syrian refugees: 3.5 million people flee to neighbouring countries | Global development | The Guardian).

Credibility and Sourcing

SOHR’s credibility and methodology have been scrutinised over the years, and the evidence overwhelmingly indicates a reliable, impartial operation. Despite being essentially a small outfit (for much of the war it was run almost single-handedly by Rami Abdulrahman), SOHR has consistently demonstrated transparency in how it gathers and verifies information. Abdulrahman describes his modus operandi simply as: “Document, verify, and publish” (The man tracking Syria’s war deaths — from Britain | The Times of Israel). In practice, this means SOHR relies on a wide network of contacts and activists inside Syria who report incidents, which are then cross-checked for accuracy. Abdulrahman often requires confirmation from multiple independent sources on the ground before reporting a casualty figure or attack. Operating like a human switchboard, he fields hundreds of calls a day from observers across Syria, then filters and corroborates these reports before releasing them (The man tracking Syria’s war deaths — from Britain | The Times of Israel) (Coventry – an unlikely home to prominent Syria activist | Reuters). This careful sourcing process – combined with Abdulrahman’s own background as a pro-democracy activist who fled Syria in 2000 after multiple arrests – has established SOHR as a rare independent voice trusted to report facts rather than propaganda.

Major international news organisations have consistently cited SOHR, reflecting its credibility. Reuters, the BBC, Agence France-Presse (AFP), the Associated Press, CNN, Al Jazeera and many others regularly quote SOHR figures in their Syria coverage. For example, as early as 2011 Reuters noted that SOHR had become a crucial source on Syria’s unrest, at a time when foreign journalists were banned (Coventry – an unlikely home to prominent Syria activist | Reuters). The Guardian explicitly referred to the Observatory as “a credible source inside the country” when citing its conflict death toll (Syrian refugees: 3.5 million people flee to neighbouring countries | Global development | The Guardian). AFP and AP reports have frequently relied on SOHR’s data – one AFP report described SOHR as “one of the few groups that has reported on violations by all sides in the conflict”, underlining its non-partisan approach (‘IS Hackers’ Take Down Syria War Monitor Site – SecurityWeek). This reputation for impartiality is reinforced by the fact that SOHR draws ire from all factions: “You know you’re doing a good job when all the sides start to attack you,” Abdulrahman quipped, noting that pro-Assad figures have accused him of rebel bias while some opposition supporters allege he’s too critical of them (The man tracking Syria’s war deaths — from Britain | The Times of Israel). Such accusations from opposing directions tend to cancel each other out, bolstering SOHR’s image as an objective monitor. Indeed, SOHR’s record includes documenting atrocities by rebels and jihadists, not only by the Assad regime, which has lent weight to its claims of impartiality.

In terms of transparency, SOHR has endeavoured to make its methods and data as open as possible given the war’s dangers. It often publishes detailed breakdowns of death tolls (for example, distinguishing civilians, regime troops, rebel fighters, jihadists, etc.), demonstrating a commitment to granular accuracy (Activists: Syria conflict death toll hits 150,344 | AP News) (Activists: Syria conflict death toll hits 150,344 | AP News). The Observatory claims to have documented, by name, tens of thousands of civilian deaths, and regularly updates totals in public reports on its website. While the identity of many on-the-ground informants must be protected (for their safety), Abdulrahman has disclosed some operational details: by 2013 he had around 200 activists across Syria’s 14 provinces feeding information, and he received modest funding (under €100,000 per year) from a European human rights organisation to support his work (The man tracking Syria’s war deaths — from Britain | The Times of Israel) (The man tracking Syria’s war deaths — from Britain | The Times of Israel). Such details, though not fully exhaustive, indicate that SOHR is not a state-sponsored entity but a small NGO-type operation with limited resources. Its track record of accuracy has been vetted over time by the global media – whenever SOHR reports an incident, it is often independently corroborated later by photos, videos or UN investigations, which has built confidence in the Observatory’s reliability. On numerous occasions, SOHR figures have been later validated or used by organisations like the UN and Human Rights Watch. The U.S.-based Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect even noted that among the most important sources of information on atrocities in Syria is the “pro-opposition Syrian Observatory for Human Rights” (Lemkin Institute: Red Alert for Genocide against Alawites in Syria – tuerkische-allgemeine.de) (More than 1,000 killed in Syrian crackdown on Alawite region, war monitor says | Reuters), underscoring that despite its small size, SOHR’s data is taken seriously in international human rights circles. In summary, through rigorous verification and a demonstrated impartial stance, SOHR has earned a reputation for credible reporting – a fact reflected in its ubiquitous citation by Reuters, BBC, AFP and beyond.

Post-HTS Takeover: Consistency of Reporting

On 8 December 2024, the Syrian government under Bashar al-Assad fell in a stunning rebel offensive led by the Islamist coalition Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) (Syrian government falls, ending 50-year rule of Assad family | AP News) (Syrian government falls, ending 50-year rule of Assad family | AP News). As HTS and allied factions seized control of Damascus and declared a new interim government, the SOHR continued its monitoring uninterrupted. The chaos of regime change did not slow the Observatory’s reporting; Abdulrahman was on the phone with contacts even as the rebels advanced. (He informed international media in real time that President Assad had fled the country by plane on 8 December, scooping many outlets on that development (Syrian government falls, ending 50-year rule of Assad family | AP News).) In the weeks and months after the HTS takeover, SOHR maintained its daily coverage of events across Syria – tracking ongoing clashes, security incidents, and emerging human rights issues under the new authorities. This continuity dispelled any notion that SOHR’s role was tied to the former conflict paradigm; instead, the Observatory proved itself committed to documenting abuses no matter who is in power.

In fact, some of SOHR’s most consequential reporting has come after HTS assumed power, as the organisation casts the same critical eye on Syria’s new rulers as it did on the prior regime. A stark example is SOHR’s coverage of a wave of sectarian violence that erupted in early March 2025 in Syria’s coastal region. Following an anti-HTS insurgent attack by supporters of the ousted Assad regime, HTS-affiliated forces launched a brutal crackdown in the largely Alawite areas of Latakia and Tartus. SOHR swiftly exposed the scale of the atrocities: over the span of 48 hours, more than 1,000 people were killed, the majority of them Alawite civilians (‘No One Is Above the Law’: Syria’s Coastal Massacres Spark Calls for Justice – The Media Line). The Observatory’s sources reported entire families shot dead and villages ravaged. According to a SOHR update (widely cited by media), the casualties in the coastal “cleansing” included roughly 745 civilian victims (women and children among them), along with over 100 Assad-regime security personnel and militiamen (More than 1,000 killed in Syrian crackdown on Alawite region, war monitor says | Reuters). Rami Abdulrahman – who had painstakingly documented Assad’s mass killings for a decade – did not mince words in describing the new atrocities. “These are sectarian massacres that aim to expel the Alawite population from their homes,” he told Reuters, emphasizing that the slaughter was not a matter of politics but of ethnic-religious hatred (More than 1,000 killed in Syrian crackdown on Alawite region, war monitor says | Reuters). He noted that this was some of the worst violence Syria had seen in years, comparable in horror to the darkest days of the civil war (More than 1,000 killed in Syrian crackdown on Alawite region, war monitor says | Reuters).

SOHR’s reporting in the HTS era has been marked by the same level of detail and forthrightness as before. The Observatory continues to catalogue every incident of abuse it can verify. In the case of the coastal massacres, it provided breakdowns of the killings area by area (Jableh, Baniyas and surrounding villages were hit especially hard (More than 1,000 killed in Syrian crackdown on Alawite region, war monitor says | Reuters)), and it documented specific incidents such as an execution-style mass killing of dozens of Alawite men in one village (More than 1,000 killed in Syrian crackdown on Alawite region, war monitor says | Reuters). SOHR also tracked the aftermath – noting, for example, the displacement of thousands of Alawite and Christian residents who fled for safety as their neighbours were being killed (More than 1,000 killed in Syrian crackdown on Alawite region, war monitor says | Reuters). By continuing to shine a light on such crimes, SOHR demonstrated that its mission transcends any political alignment. Whether abuses are committed by Assad’s forces or by the HTS-led “Salvation Government,” the group aims to report them faithfully. Indeed, genocide watchdog groups have echoed SOHR’s findings: the Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention issued an urgent alert in March 2025 warning of a “critical risk of genocide” against Syria’s Alawites, citing videos of unarmed Alawite civilians (including women and children) being executed by HTS-linked fighters (Lemkin Institute: Red Alert for Genocide against Alawites in Syria – tuerkische-allgemeine.de). The gruesome details – men tortured and forced to bark like animals before execution, bodies left strewn in the streets of Alawite towns – were exactly the kind of evidence SOHR had brought to the world’s attention (Lemkin Institute: Red Alert for Genocide against Alawites in Syria – tuerkische-allgemeine.de) (Lemkin Institute: Red Alert for Genocide against Alawites in Syria – tuerkische-allgemeine.de). This underscores that even after HTS’s rise, SOHR remains one of the primary sources ensuring that atrocities do not go undocumented. The group has kept up its regular press releases and reports into 2025, covering everything from ongoing detention practices by HTS security to attacks by remnant ISIS cells – thereby remaining true to its mandate of impartial human rights monitoring, irrespective of Syria’s shifting power structure.

HTS Rhetoric and Discreditation Efforts

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s attitude toward SOHR appeared to shift notably once HTS took power. While in insurgency HTS had little official engagement with SOHR (often tacitly accepting its war reports as useful against the Assad regime), as the de facto government HTS has grown increasingly hostile to SOHR’s scrutiny. In the wake of the coastal massacres, HTS leaders and pro-HTS media began publicly denying or downplaying reports of atrocities and at times directly attacking SOHR’s credibility. For example, the new Syrian authorities (dominated by HTS) issued statements describing the mass killings on the coast as the result of isolated “individual violations” by uncontrolled local elements, rather than a systematic campaign – an attempt to deflect blame (Hundreds killed in sectarian mass killings in Syria : Peoples Dispatch). A Defence Ministry spokesman claimed the situation was under control and that those responsible were merely “popular unorganised masses” who took revenge on their own (Hundreds killed in sectarian mass killings in Syria : Peoples Dispatch). This narrative implicitly contradicted SOHR’s well-documented findings of a coordinated sectarian purge, and it signalled HTS’s desire to undermine reports of its abuses.

Beyond official statements, HTS and its supporters have waged a disinformation and smear campaign against the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights via state media outlets and social networks. As SOHR revealed more details of the Alawite massacres, an online backlash from pro-HTS accounts accused SOHR of lying. Unfounded claims began circulating on HTS-linked Telegram channels and Twitter (X) that the Observatory was “circulating lies about massacres” and exaggerating what HTS termed the “so-called genocide” on the coast (The Cradle on X: “UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights …). This rhetoric – labelling verified atrocity reports as fake news – mirrors tactics authoritarian regimes often use to discredit critics. HTS propagandists have sought to paint SOHR as biased or as a tool of foreign agendas. Ironically, this echoes past attempts by pro-Assad outlets (and their allies) to dismiss SOHR as the “so-called” observatory whenever its reports of regime atrocities surfaced. Now HTS employs a similar playbook, attempting to cast doubt on SOHR’s impartiality since its reporting is inconvenient to the new rulers’ image. The smear campaign intensified on social media in mid-March 2025: coordinated posts and even fabricated “news” reports emerged, all aiming to tarnish SOHR’s reputation or dispute its findings. The Observatory noted with alarm a slew of fake pages and imposter accounts disseminating false information under its name, as well as partisan bloggers spreading conspiracy theories about SOHR.

Crucially, these efforts by HTS came only after the group found itself implicated in serious human rights abuses. For over a decade, SOHR had been a thorn in the Assad regime’s side; HTS initially benefited from SOHR’s exposure of regime brutality. But once HTS itself was in the spotlight for committing atrocities, its tone changed. The group’s leader (now interim president) Ahmad al-Sharaa – better known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani – began voicing irritation at “exaggerated” media reports. In a televised address he warned his security forces not to overreact or tarnish the new government’s morals, a remark interpreted as damage control amidst the massacre revelations (More than 1,000 killed in Syrian crackdown on Alawite region, war monitor says | Reuters). Meanwhile, no senior HTS official directly named SOHR, but the ecosystem of HTS-aligned media did. For instance, HTS-associated figures accused SOHR of being an agent of the defeated Assad “deep state” trying to sow division, a claim with no evidence. The attacks on SOHR’s credibility ranged from questioning its casualty numbers to implying it was part of an international plot against Syria’s “Islamic revolution.” SOHR has forcefully rejected these accusations, standing by the veracity of its reports. In an official response, the Observatory stated it was “shocked at the fierce, systematic smear campaigns” targeting it, launched just after it disclosed details of what it called a mass genocide on the Syrian coastline (Systematic smear campaigns and reports target all SOHR platforms). It pointed out that facts on the ground, including video evidence and eyewitness testimonies, substantiate its reporting – evidence that HTS cannot easily refute. Nevertheless, HTS’s rhetoric and disinformation efforts pose a real challenge: by undermining SOHR in the eyes of HTS’s sympathisers, the group seeks to diminish the impact of SOHR’s damning findings and avoid accountability.

Cyberattacks and Online Harassment

In the past two weeks, coinciding with SOHR’s reporting on HTS-linked atrocities, the organisation has faced a surge of cyberattacks and coordinated online harassment. According to SOHR’s own statements, its website, servers, and social media accounts have been subjected to relentless attacks aimed at silencing its voice. “We are shocked at the fierce systematic cyber attacks and smear campaigns against SOHR and its platforms,” the Observatory announced, noting that multiple SOHR online accounts were targeted simultaneously (Systematic smear campaigns and reports target all SOHR platforms). The nature of these cyber offensives has included Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks to crash the SOHR website, hacking attempts to penetrate or deface its pages, and possibly efforts to compromise administrator credentials. SOHR reported that hackers flooded its site with traffic and attempted to falsify content related to the recent massacres, essentially trying to erase or distort the record of what happened (Backed by Syrian authorities | Cyber attacks launched from Arab …). On social media, coordinated harassment has taken the form of brigades of accounts mass-reporting SOHR’s Facebook and Twitter posts (an attempt to get them taken down for “violations”), as well as direct threats and abusive messages sent to SOHR’s team.

The suspected sources of these cyberattacks have been hinted at, though not officially confirmed. SOHR stated that “reliable sources” indicate the involvement of cyber-security teams based in an Arab state in orchestrating the campaign to falsify facts about the coastal genocide (Backed by Syrian authorities | Cyber attacks launched from Arab …). This strongly suggests a state-sponsored element to the attacks, rather than just random hacker groups. Observers have speculated that a country with ties to HTS’s leadership might be covertly assisting in cyber warfare to protect the new Syrian government’s image. (It is noteworthy that during the civil war, several Gulf states were sympathetic to rebel factions; one of those states could now be lending HTS technical support.) Additionally, SOHR accused “Syrian authorities” – i.e. the HTS-led government – of backing the cyber offensive (Report Syrian on X: ” Syrian Observatory With the support of the …). In other words, the digital assault on SOHR appears to be a coordinated effort involving the HTS regime and possibly an external state ally, aiming to silence a critical witness to human rights abuses. This marks a new front in the conflict: not just a physical one but an information war in cyberspace.

The impact of the attacks on SOHR has been significant but not crippling. For a short period in mid-March 2025, SOHR’s primary website experienced outages and intermittent downtime as a result of DDoS floods. Some reports and archives became temporarily inaccessible, raising concerns about potential data loss. SOHR technicians and partners worked to fend off the attacks and restore services. The Observatory has emphasized that no permanent data loss occurred, and that it maintains secure backups of all documentation. (SOHR is painfully aware of cyber risks – back in July 2015 it was hit by an ISIS-affiliated hacker group calling itself the “Cyber Army of the Khilafah”, which defaced the website with a threatening image of Abdulrahman and claimed to have wiped out its data (‘IS Hackers’ Take Down Syria War Monitor Site – SecurityWeek) (‘IS Hackers’ Take Down Syria War Monitor Site – SecurityWeek). On that occasion, the hackers did manage to destroy some data on the server, but SOHR had retained copies of all published information, allowing it to fully recover (‘IS Hackers’ Take Down Syria War Monitor Site – SecurityWeek) (‘IS Hackers’ Take Down Syria War Monitor Site – SecurityWeek). That episode served as a lesson in robust data backup.) In the current attacks, it appears SOHR’s preparation paid off: despite intense pressure, the group continued publishing updates via alternate channels when its site was down – including on social media and through contacts with news agencies.

Digital rights experts note that what SOHR is experiencing fits a broader pattern of authoritarian regimes and extremist groups targeting human rights monitors online. A 2022 CIVICUS cybersecurity briefing observed that journalists and human rights defenders are frequently subject to hacking, phishing, and DDoS attacks precisely because of the sensitive information they expose (Safety & Cyber Security: 8 Tips for Civil Society Digital Defense). In SOHR’s case, the timing of the cyber onslaught – immediately after it publicized evidence of sectarian mass killings – suggests an intent to punish and suppress. The online harassment has also included death threats and intimidation directed at SOHR’s director and sources, an obvious attempt to scare them into silence. Such tactics underscore the personal risks SOHR’s staff face, even operating from abroad. Nonetheless, SOHR has publicly resolved to continue its work undeterred. “No matter how many fabricated reports or smear campaigns are launched,” the organisation stated defiantly, “we will carry on conveying the truth” (paraphrasing a recent SOHR press release). Supporters around the world, including other Syrian activists and international NGOs, have rallied online with hashtags to support SOHR and condemn the attacks – for example, #StopAlawiteGenocideInSyria and messages of solidarity with SOHR’s mission. The resilience of SOHR’s digital operations thus far, and its refusal to be cowed by cyber intimidation, highlight the importance of protecting independent monitors in conflict zones. Going forward, shoring up SOHR’s cyber defenses and countering disinformation will be critical to ensure it can keep reporting the facts on the ground.

Strategic Outlook and Recommendations

Facing the twin challenges of a hostile regime in Syria and determined cyber assaults, SOHR must adopt a proactive strategy to safeguard its operations, credibility, and digital infrastructure. The following are forward-looking recommendations for how the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights can fortify itself in the current environment:

  • Bolster Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience: SOHR should immediately strengthen its technical defenses to withstand hacking and DDoS attacks. This includes using cloud-based DDoS protection services – for example, Google’s free Project Shield, which is specifically designed to defend news and human rights websites from denial-of-service attacks. (Project Shield leverages Google’s global infrastructure to filter out malicious traffic; it has successfully absorbed some of the largest DDoS attacks ever recorded (With political ‘hacktivism’ on the rise, Google launches Project Shield to fight DDos attacks) (With political ‘hacktivism’ on the rise, Google launches Project Shield to fight DDos attacks). Enrolling SOHR’s site in such a programme would make it far harder for attackers to knock it offline.) Additionally, SOHR must ensure all its servers and accounts are secured with strong authentication (such as multi-factor logins) and up-to-date encryption. Regular offline backups of all data are essential, as demonstrated by the 2015 ISIS hack – having backups allowed SOHR to recover quickly from that breach (‘IS Hackers’ Take Down Syria War Monitor Site – SecurityWeek). The organisation could also distribute its content across multiple platforms or mirror sites so that no single point of failure exists. Engaging professional cybersecurity experts or NGOs that assist civil society (for instance, Access Now’s Digital Security Helpline or Front Line Defenders’ digital protection programme) can provide tailored guidance. Given that many attacks begin with phishing or malware targeting individuals, SOHR’s staff and volunteers should be trained in basic cyber hygiene – verifying emails, avoiding suspicious links, using secure messaging for sensitive communications, and so on (Safety & Cyber Security: 8 Tips for Civil Society Digital Defense). By hardening its cyber infrastructure and practising vigilance, SOHR can significantly reduce the risk of successful attacks.
  • Maintain and Demonstrate Rigor in Sourcing: To protect its credibility, SOHR should continue its strict verification practices and consider making its methodology as transparent as safely possible. This might involve publishing periodic reports explaining how data is collected and cross-checked, and providing anonymised examples of source networks in different regions. While protecting informants is paramount, even a general outline of SOHR’s process (e.g. “we require confirmation from at least two independent sources for each event”) would enhance outside understanding of its reliability. Consistency and accuracy will speak for themselves over time – SOHR’s statistics and reports should always err on the side of caution and factual correctness. If occasional errors occur (inevitable in conflict reporting), SOHR should correct them publicly and promptly, to underscore its commitment to truth over narrative. It could also invite collaboration with independent experts to audit certain datasets (for instance, comparing its casualty figures with those of other monitoring groups) to show that it has nothing to hide. By doubling down on its founding principle to “document, verify, and publish” with objectivity (The man tracking Syria’s war deaths — from Britain | The Times of Israel), SOHR will continue to outlast false accusations. In essence, staying factual and transparent is the best defence against propaganda, as lies eventually fall apart under scrutiny.
  • Engage in Strategic Partnerships and Collaboration: SOHR does not have to operate in isolation. Forming alliances with reputable human rights and civil society organisations can amplify its voice and provide it with institutional support. For example, closer collaboration with other Syrian monitoring groups like the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) or international NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch could be mutually beneficial. Joint statements or reports on major atrocities (citing SOHR’s on-the-ground data alongside the partner organisations’ research) would add weight and help fend off attempts to dismiss SOHR as a lone voice. During the recent sectarian massacres, several Syrian Christian and Druze community leaders spoke out in support of the truth of what happened – SOHR could connect with these local voices to publish combined findings, showing a united front of civil society against misinformation. Furthermore, SOHR should keep lines of communication open with United Nations investigatory bodies, war crimes tribunals, and academic researchers studying the Syrian conflict. Its decade-plus archive is a treasure trove that could aid accountability; by sharing data (in a secure manner) with official inquiries, SOHR gains allies who can validate and use its information. Such collaboration also sends a message to HTS and others that SOHR is not alone – it is part of a broader human rights community that will push back against attempts to silence it. Even partnerships in the digital realm are useful: tech companies and digital rights coalitions can offer support if they are aware of SOHR’s plight. For instance, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube should be alerted to the harassment and fake accounts so they can assist in protecting SOHR’s official channels. Building a network of supportive organisations and experts will reinforce SOHR’s resilience and credibility.
  • Public Advocacy and Exposure of Disinformation: To counter HTS’s rhetoric and smear campaigns, SOHR should actively engage in public advocacy about what is happening. This means not only reporting the facts, but also reporting on the efforts to cover up those facts. SOHR has already started doing this by publicising the cyberattacks and smears. Going forward, it could release a special report or press briefing on the disinformation campaign itself – documenting how certain media outlets or social media accounts spread falsehoods after the coastal massacres, and naming (if possible) the entities behind them. By shining a light on the propaganda, SOHR turns the tables on those trying to discredit it. Engaging with international media for investigative pieces on HTS’s disinformation (for example, working with journalists to trace the origin of fake Facebook posts or hacked content) can generate headlines that expose the campaign against SOHR, ironically using the global press to hold HTS accountable for its attempts to manipulate the narrative. Diplomatically, SOHR and its supporters should brief key governments and UN officials on these issues. If nations like the UK (where SOHR is based) or allies like the EU publicly condemn the harassment of SOHR, it provides a layer of political protection. SOHR might also seek support from press freedom groups such as Reporters Without Borders (RSF) or the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), framing the attacks on SOHR as attacks on freedom of information. Such advocacy could pressure HTS to restrain its followers from further smears and make clear that the world is watching. In summary, speaking loudly about the attempts to silence SOHR is itself a protective strategy, as it robs the attackers of the shadows in which they operate.
  • Enhanced Digital Outreach and Redundancy: To ensure its vital information reaches the world, SOHR should diversify and modernise its dissemination channels. Relying on a single website or single Twitter account is risky. Instead, SOHR can use multiple platforms in parallel: continuing to post updates on its official website and Facebook/Twitter (X), but also utilising Telegram channels, WhatsApp broadcast lists, and email newsletters to reach subscribers directly. This way, even if one platform is temporarily down or compromised, followers can get news via another. The Observatory might create regional language feeds (for instance, a feed in Arabic – which it has – and maybe in French or Spanish through partners) to broaden its international audience and make it harder to censor its content globally. It’s also wise to have a presence on humanitarian information portals like ReliefWeb, where many NGOs repost reports – this provides an external archive of SOHR’s key findings. Technical measures like content delivery networks (CDNs) and load-balancing (offered by services such as Project Shield) will improve uptime and speed for users worldwide (With political ‘hacktivism’ on the rise, Google launches Project Shield to fight DDos attacks) (With political ‘hacktivism’ on the rise, Google launches Project Shield to fight DDos attacks). Another outreach strategy is to produce more in-depth analytical reports (in addition to daily news blasts), which can be shared as PDFs – these can circulate even if websites are down, and they tend to be taken seriously by policymakers. Essentially, SOHR should aim to stay one step ahead of censors: if a hostile actor tries to knock out one medium, SOHR’s message should still find its way out through alternative routes. Investing effort in social media verification (e.g. obtaining verified status on platforms, to prevent imposters) and clearly signaling official channels will help the public trust what they read. By embracing a multi-pronged dissemination strategy, SOHR will make it practically impossible for anyone – be it HTS or its allies – to completely shut down its voice.

In conclusion, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights can continue to fulfill its crucial role by strengthening its cyber defences, standing firm on its principles of accurate reporting, and leveraging support from the wider human rights and technology communities. Fourteen years of steadfast monitoring have earned SOHR worldwide respect; with prudent measures, it can weather the current storm of threats and emerge even more robust. The need for independent documentation in Syria is as great as ever – especially under a new regime whose commitment to human rights is deeply suspect. By protecting itself and its work, SOHR will also be protecting the truth of what is happening in Syria, ensuring that perpetrators of abuses cannot operate in the dark. The Observatory’s resilience will serve not only its own mission but the Syrian people’s historical record, and ultimately, the pursuit of justice for atrocities old and new. Maintaining SOHR’s integrity and operational security is therefore strategically vital, and the recommendations above aim to secure the Observatory’s ability to continue “documenting, verifying and publishing” the facts, whatever challenges arise.

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Ali Moheyaldeen

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